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CONFRONTING EUROPEAN 
DIVERSITY:
DELIBERATION IN A 
TRANSNATIONAL AND 
PLURI-LINGUAL SETTING
Abstract
In this article, we confront some commonly held assump-
tions and objections with regard to the feasibility of deliber-
ation in a transnational and pluri-lingual setting. To illustrate 
our argument, we rely on an analysis of group discussions 
from EuroPolis, a transnational deliberative experiment that 
took place one week ahead of the 2009 European Parliamen-
tary elections. The European deliberative poll is an ideal case 
for testing the viability of deliberative democracy across 
political cultures because it introduces variation in terms 
of constituency and group plurality under the controlled 
conditions of quasi-experimental scientifi c setting. For 
measuring group dynamics and interactions we apply a 
modifi ed version of the Discourse Quality Index (DQI) that 
is combined with a qualitative content analysis of selected 
sequences of discussions. Findings show that participants of 
transnational deliberative polling 1) generally recognise the 
EU polity as a reference point for exercising communicative 
power and impact on decision-making, and 2) are in fact 
able to interact and debate across languages and cultures, 
developing a self-awareness of citizens of a shared polity 
and thereby turning a heterogeneous group of randomly 
selected citizens into a constituency of democracy.
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Introduction
The debate on the democratic defi cit of the EU has increasingly involved calls 
for a more profound engagement of “ordinary” citizens in European politics. The 
low level of political participation in EU politics has become all the more acute in 
recent years as the so-called “permissive consensus” has been cast aside by growing 
discontent among citizens with the integration project (Hooghe and Marks 2009); 
most clearly visible in a string of popular rejections of the Constitutional and Lis-
bon Treaties. Moreover, the new diversity of the enlarged Europe is potentially a 
further obstacle to mutual understanding among the peoples of Europe and the 
activation of European citizenship. European Parliamentary elections thus far 
rather amplifi ed the problem addressing the citizens mainly as uninformed voters, 
displaying decreasing turnouts and increasing support for populist parties and 
Eurosceptic opposition. 
After the “period of refl ection” that followed the 2005 rejection of the EU 
Constitutional Treaty, EU institutions took a deliberative turn manifested in the 
implementation of numerous deliberative experiences based on the involvement 
of lay citizens in public debate across Europe. Even though the institutional and 
procedural design of the expanding participatory regime of EU governance has 
been widely analysed, only few empirical studies have thus far analysed the con-
ditions and capacities for citizen deliberation within the EU (Abels 2009; Hüller 
2010; Friedrich 2011). EU analysts have however repeatedly emphasised that the 
generation of democratic legitimacy in a sett ing of enhanced socio-economic, po-
litical and cultural diversity is constrained by the lack of a common public sphere 
that guarantees a certain degree of uniformity of public opinion and will formation 
(Grimm 1995; Schlesinger and Fossum 2007). 
In this article we analyse whether enhanced diversity of a group of deliberating 
citizens and the fuzziness of the polity to which they respond impacts the consti-
tution of a mini-public of democratic self-government. We argue that the potential 
of citizens’ deliberation to generate democratic legitimacy is dependent on par-
ticipants’ disposition to recognise, fi rst, the polity as a legitimate entity to exercise 
political authority, and second, to identify as a constituency, i.e. as members of a 
political community that is (self)empowered to authorise and control government. 
The EU poses a challenge to both the polity and the constituency dimension. In 
formal terms, the EU exercises political authority, but is it recognised by the citizens 
as a legitimate entity for delegating collectively binding decision-making (the polity 
dimension)? Secondly, the EU has established a complex citizenship regime, but 
do citizens identify as a constituency of rights holders and democratic agents of 
public authorisation and control (the constituency dimension)? 
Europolis – a deliberative polling project in the EU – introduced variation along 
these two constitutive dimensions of democratic legitimacy which are commonly 
treated as independent variables in deliberative experiments within national po-
litical sett ings. Our argument is that both dimensions, the recognition of political 
authority and the identifi cation of the citizenry, are not simply to be considered as 
constitutive elements of democracy. Both dimensions are rather to be seen as pos-
sible outcomes of the process of building democratic legitimacy through refl exive 
reason-giving (see Eriksen 2005). 
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In the following we therefore explore the possibility of a positive correlation 
between participation in deliberative polling and the formation of a democratic 
constituency. The guiding hypotheses are that, as an eﬀ ect of deliberation with 
other European citizens, participants of deliberative polling start to a) recognise 
the EU as a legitimate authority for collective problem solving (polity hypothesis), 
and b) identify as a constituency of democratic politics (constituency hypothesis). 
Deliberation can thus trigger refl exive processes conducive to the establishment 
of both legitimate government and the democratic agents of authorisation and 
control. In the context of citizen deliberation, this polity and constituency generating 
power of deliberation (see Cooke 2000) is overlapping and mutually dependent. We 
conceptualise the refl exivity of the deliberative sett ing in procedural terms through 
the generation of knowledge and shared normative perspectives among the partic-
ipants that help to qualify (or validate) the substantial policy issues at stake and to 
establish mutual understanding and agreement (Eriksen 2005, 17). In the Deweyan 
sense, then, we observe whether and how individuals identify as democratic agents 
(as a public) through critical practices, which authorise political power and, at the 
same time and through the same practices, constitute the community of citizens 
that is in charge of the control of this power (Dewey 1927).  
Confronting European Diversity: 
The Polity and the Constituency Contested
Deliberative polling has thus far been applied mainly within national and 
monolingual sett ings: Respondents were chosen from one legally demarcated, and 
socially and culturally recognised constituency. In addition they respond mainly to 
one (either local, regional or national) level of government. Deliberative theorists, 
including the designers of deliberative polling, have however emphasised that 
diversity of opinions needs to be considered as a necessary procedural condition for 
deliberation to facilitate opinion change and learning (Fishkin and Luskin 2005; 
Sunstein 2009; Thompson 2008). This is based on the argument that deliberating 
citizens from diverse socio-cultural backgrounds can learn to acknowledge and 
respect the plurality of values and views that exist within a polity and contribute to 
the construction of the public good (Benhabib 1994; Gutmann and Thompson 1996). 
We argue that experimenting with citizen deliberation in the transnational 
sett ing of Europolis creates two additional challenges. Firstly, the applicability 
of the experiment is put into question by the fact that the group of randomly 
selected participants is situated within a “non-fi nished” polity. Political authority 
of the EU is neither legally consolidated nor socially accepted. The EU polity as 
the reference point for the sample is not the familiar environment of national or 
regional government but a complex multi-level governance arrangement. This in-
troduces uncertainty with regard to the question of which type of administration, 
legislative procedures and formal government deliberation should exert infl uence 
on. Is communicative power expressed through transnational deliberative bodies 
renationalised in the sense that participants target mainly domestic institutions 
and decision-making processes or do such “mini-publics” also pay tribute to the 
complexity of multi-level governance in the sense of empowering European insti-
tutions and supranational authority? 
Secondly, the constituency from which the representative sample is chosen for de-
liberative polling lacks concrete political recognition in the EU sett ing. Participants 
60
of Europolis were not members of a pre-established demos or a fully recognised 
political community. Participants rather represented lay citizens from 27 member 
states and spoke 23 diﬀ erent languages. The constituency of democratic politics 
in the EU is arguably neither fully legally recognised nor does it recognise itself 
as a politically bounded and culturally distinct community. EU constituents are 
unbounded, multi-dimensional and contested (Abromeit and Schmidt 1998; Fos-
sum and Trenz 2006). Statistical indicators for drawing a representative sample of 
European citizens can therefore not rely solely on the background assumption of 
a relatively homogeneous and monolingual population but must take into account 
the existence of pluri-ethnic and pluri-lingual fragmented groups as well as shifting 
minorities and majorities. 
In confronting these two challenges, the feasibility of deliberative democracy 
in the EU has been discussed widely. From the one side meaningful and equal 
deliberation in a complex and culturally pluralistic EU is seen as an impossible 
project. The democratic defi cit of the EU is seen here as structurally rooted in 
the absence of a European demos. The people(s) of Europe do not simply have a 
common identity as citizens of the same polity. They also lack the socio-cultural 
prerequisites to become united, e.g. through a common language, a shared cultural 
background or through participation in an encompassing public and media sphere 
(see e.g. Grimm 1995; Oﬀ e and Preuss 2007; Kraus 2008). In this line of reasoning, 
deliberation works best, if political culture is contextualised, pluralism of opinions 
is contained, participants speak the same language, share a common ethical under-
standing and pay each other respect as co-citizens (Habermas 1998, Wessler 2008). 
The upshot of this is, then, that democratisation in terms of engaging citizens and 
fostering a vibrant public sphere on the transnational level is an impossible task. 
If cultures demarcate diﬀ erent discursive universes, discourses between cultures 
must be seen as principally problematic (Leigh 2004). 
From the other side, diﬀ erent solutions have been discussed for reconciling 
political equality with deep diversity in multicultural societies (Fossum 2003, Fra-
ser and Honneth 2004). There is a tendency in homogeneous deliberative sett ings 
that familiarity and closeness leads to unjustifi ed extremism (see Sunstein 2009, 
3). Like-minded people tend to amplify their pre-existing views and reduce their 
internal diversity (ibid., 8). High degrees of solidarity and pre-existing aﬀ ective 
ties even increase these eﬀ ects of group polarisation (ibid.: 42-44). Deliberative 
polling contributes to avoiding such polarising traits of groups by creating a sett ing 
where people do not start out with strong convictions. Participants are confronted 
instead with plural views and new information that breaks familiar sett ings. In 
this line of reasoning, we would expect that group heterogeneity is a favourable 
condition in transnational sett ings. Group polarisation eﬀ ects should be unlikely 
and deliberation should be on average more balanced and less “extreme” than in 
national sett ings. The upshot is: deliberation works bett er if it includes diverse 
people: “Cognitive diversity is crucial to the success of deliberative democracy” 
(ibid., 142-43).  
Another manifestation of deep diversity in the EU sett ing is its pluri-lingual 
traits (Kraus 2008). The question of whether and how groups can interact and seek 
understanding across languages is therefore highly relevant. Findings from social 
movement research show that pluri-linguism at the European level does not nec-
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essarily impair the inclusivity and epistemic quality of deliberative sett ings such 
as the European Social Forum as compared to the exchange among movement 
activists at the national level (Doerr 2008, 2009). Translations can potentially help 
out in exceptional circumstances, for instance, in the case of professional groups or 
among experts. But can the epistemic condition of democracy be met in a pluri-lin-
gual random sample of citizens? 
The critical issue in confronting European diversity is how transformative the 
deliberative poll can potentially be in a transnational sett ing. The transformative 
power of deliberation can alter individual preferences towards the identifi cation of 
a common good (Mansbridge 2010). But deliberation can be also transformative in 
the sense of social learning and group identifi cation. In Europolis the participants 
were at the same time empowered as potential voters in European Parliament 
elections. Against their diverse socio-cultural backgrounds they were confronted 
with problems of common relevance and through their communicative exchanges 
around these issues, they learned to articulate their shared concerns, (e.g. in the 
question rounds with experts and political representatives), fl eshed them out with 
reasons and justifi cations and critically refl ected on their experiences. Deliberation 
is in this sense embedded in social learning processes (Trenz and Eder 2004). It 
spurs not only refl ection over the policy issues at stake but also over the process 
itself as a collective experience. This community generating potential of deliberation is 
at the core of our empirical analysis. The critical yardstick for concluding on the 
community generating eﬀ ects of deliberation in Europolis is, then, the extent to 
which a randomly selected group of individuals from diverse national and linguis-
tic backgrounds turned into a critical public, which recognised EU authority and 
developed a notion of identity.
Method and Data
Taking place one week ahead of the 2009 European Parliamentary election, Eu-
roPolis was set up to conduct a transnational deliberative experiment that engaged 
348 citizens from all EU Member States. The Europolis research design followed 
standard Deliberative Poll design.1 The event specifi cally addressed climate change 
and immigration control, two high-profi le issues of recent political debates in Eu-
rope. The participants were assigned into 25 small groups consisting of two or three 
languages. Discussions were led by moderators who had the task to raise certain 
pre-determined issues for debate as well as to manage the workings of the group, 
but still with a minimalistic approach to moderation. In addition, there was a host 
of translators involved with each group due to their pluri-lingual character, thus 
allowing verbal exchange in the participants’ mother tongue.
Europolis produced two sets of data. The fi rst were collected using question-
naires and those allow us to measure both, pre- and post-deliberation opinions and 
knowledge level and the perceptions of the participants at the end of experiment. 
The second were audio recordings of the debates in all small group discussions of 
the event. The small group debates have been coded by using a modifi ed version 
of the Discourse Quality Index (DQI). The DQI is a measurement instrument2 that 
relies on qualitative coding of debates based on a carefully constructed coding 
scheme3 and represents a quantitative measure of deliberation based on Habermas’ 
concept of discourse ethics. The main goal of the DQI is to tap a continuum that 
62
ranges from the complete violation of Habermas’ discourse ethics to the ideal speech 
act. The initial DQI was constructed to analyse elite deliberation in parliamentary 
assemblies (Steiner et al. 2004). Europolis was, however, about citizen deliberation. 
The DQI was subsequently modifi ed to include a new set of categories.4 We coded 
and analysed small group discussions on immigration control in 4 groups of the 
following language composition: the fi rst was composed of Italian and English 
speakers; the second of English speakers and Bulgarians; the third of English, 
French and Portuguese; and a fourth group of Italians, Spaniards, and Swedes. 
Beyond Attitudinal Data: 
Opening the Black Box of Deliberation
Deliberative polling has, thus far, relied principally on att itudinal data to mea-
sure the transformative eﬀ ects of deliberation. In our study we take att itudinal 
changes of participants of Europolis, in both the “polity” and the “constituency” 
dimension, as a starting point of our discussion. With regard to the fi rst dimen-
sion, the questionnaire measures participants’ att itudes on decision-making levels 
before they started the discussions but after they read the briefi ng materials and 
after deliberation with regard to the two debated issues (immigration and climate 
change) and two “control” issues (unemployment and crime).5 The results show 
that participants of the groups that were analysed became more favourable of 
shifting decision-making powers to the supranational level on the “control” issues6 
(unemployment and crime) but less favourable on immigration and climate change. 
With regard to the second dimension, the Europolis questionnaire results indicate 
that deliberation in a transnational sett ing shows a clear potential to spur identity 
change among the participants.7 More concretely, the share of participants that 
perceived themselves as national citizens only decreased signifi cantly after partic-
ipation in the deliberative poll. Participants turned from identifying in exclusive 
nationalist terms to becoming “inclusive nationalists,” i.e. they also identifi ed as 
members of a community of Europeans. 
In order to understand bett er why deliberation led participants to become 
more nationalist in their polity preferences while at the same time socialising in a 
transnational group sett ing it is necessary to analyse micro processes of debate and 
group formation in deliberative polling. Relying principally on aggregated ques-
tionnaire data, deliberative polls have so far not systematically covered “real-life” 
experiences of deliberating citizens.
Our in-depth analysis of deliberative group discussions is an att empt to enter 
the black box of deliberation. For that purpose, we rely on behavioural data from 
audio recordings of the debates in 4 out of 25 small groups that discussed the issue 
of immigration. Qualitative content analysis of the transcribed discussions was 
applied to select speech acts, in which the polity and constituency dimensions were 
raised by the participants. Relevant text was tagged during the coding process to 
expose arguments and story lines used by participants. We do not claim that the 
quotes are “representative” of overall discussions, but rather use the quotes to fi rstly 
illustrate and elaborate on fi ndings from the quantitative data regarding the polity 
dimension, and secondly to highlight specifi c sequences of critical refl exivity among 
citizens regarding the constituency dimension. This approach made it possible to 
tease out substantive issues raised by participants in actual deliberative moments. 
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The selection of quotes was as such done in a sequential manner. Based on initial 
descriptive analysis we then went back to the substantive debates to recover quotes 
that underlined the results.
Our qualitative analysis further needs to be considered as exploratory in the 
sense that we cannot rely on any comparative baseline as well as no comparable data 
from other deliberative polls or mini-publics. Indeed, the experimental character 
of deliberative polling raises the question of its relevance to political analysis. We 
argue that the counterfactual nature of deliberative polls in itself can be used as a 
starting point for answering the questions of polity recognition and constituency 
formation in an EU sett ing. In this sense, Europolis as an orchestrated multicul-
tural and pluri-lingual event is meant to put key notions of deliberative theory to 
test. Against this background of a counterfactual sett ing (the deliberative poll as 
the opinions of citizens if given opportunity to deliberate) and the uniformity of 
deliberative theory (a modicum of linguistic and cultural understanding needed 
for deliberation) we can explore the potential of citizen deliberation in a transna-
tional sett ing.
To investigate the transformative potential of deliberation in relation to this 
set of data, we can operationalise our guiding polity and constituency hypotheses 
as follows:
Polity Dimension. As an indicator of recognition of the EU polity, we expect 
that participants justify their arguments less in terms of particular group interests 
or references to their country of origin but by referring to the benefi ts of EU/Eu-
rope, or to common good principles. We further expect that European or common 
good-oriented justifi cations increase as an eﬀ ect of group discussion while particu-
laristic (nationalist) justifi cations decrease over time. The DQI has a variable called 
“content of justifi cation.” This variable allows for the measurement of justifi cation 
of arguments. Originally, this was set up to capture whether arguments were made 
in terms of narrow group interests, in terms of the common good, or in terms of 
both (Steiner et al. 2004, 58). To capture the specifi ca of citizens’ deliberation8 in 
Europolis on European issues, we added the category Europe justifi ed speech acts. 
Through content analysis of the transcribed group discussions we expect to fi nd 
specifi c instances of “polity contestation” that involve participants spontaneously 
in debates about the delegation of political authority and the preferred institutional/
constitutional design of the EU.
Constituency Dimension. As an indicator of the formation of a political com-
munity, we expect that participants participate equally in group discussions and 
that no linguistic group dominates over others.9 Furthermore, we look at the role 
of the facilitator, in order to determine to what degree equal participation has been 
encouraged and if that was the case, which participants needed encouragement.10 
We further measure degrees of interactivity between participants across languages 
and whether these interactions include positive, neutral or negative reference to 
other participants’ arguments.11 Through content analysis of the transcribed group 
discussions we expect to fi nd specifi c instances of “constituency contestation” that 
involve participants spontaneously in debates about the confi nement of the political 
community and degrees of common identifi cation in Europe. 
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Analysis: Deliberative Citizens in Action
The Polity Dimension
Coding the group discussions by the use of DQI helps us to understand how 
participants in a transnational deliberative sett ing exchange arguments in political 
debates on the EU and how they justify the appropriateness of collective choices 
and levels of decision-making. The underlying assumption is that citizens by ex-
pressing preferences with regard to specifi c policy solutions (that were measured 
trough use of questionnaires) also raise validity claims relating to the common 
good of the issue under debate: Within what particular institutional arrangements 
are arguments held to be valid and who should be the main benefi ciary of a given 
policy solution and to whom shall collective decisions apply? In a given sett ing, 
should the collective choice respond to the needs of the participants’ own country, 
the EU, or global community?
To analyse whether European or global-oriented justifi cations increase as an 
eﬀ ect of group discussions we adopted a sequencing approach. Diﬀ erent sequences 
were separated following the agenda of the group discussion. The fi rst phase of 
discussion evolved mainly around the identifi cation of the problems at stake. The 
second phase was more strongly infl uenced by the moderators, who coordinated 
the more formalised task to formulate questions for the plenary session. These 
questions were based on a selection of previously justifi ed contributions to the 
debate, which made a further engagement of the participants in justifi catory dis-
course during this phase redundant. The third phase was again more open and 
allowed participants to synthesise debates on the issue, express their opinions on the 
plenaries with experts and refl ect their experiences. Deliberation in this last phase 
was found to be frequently less issue focused and more geared towards refl ection 
of the common understanding of the citizens and their att itudes towards the EU. 
Leaving aside the more formalised sett ing of the second phase, we would expect to 
observe that European common good orientation among the participants increase 
from the fi rst to the third phase. Table 1 largely confi rms this hypothesis. As an 
eﬀ ect of knowledge increase, learning and socialisation during the experiment 
participants became more “European” in their justifi cations and recognised the EU 
polity as a legitimate entity of problem-solving. At the end of the experiment one 
third of the justifi cations delivered contained a European common good reference, 
while references to national interest clearly diminished. 
Table 1:  Justifi cation
All groups (7, 8, 11, 12) Discussion Formulation of questions
Discussion after 
plenary
 N speech acts (excluded moderator) 202 74 73
 N of speech acts justifi ed 
among which: 109 40 25
group interests, own country 25.9% 25.5% 12.5%
Europe 31.5% 19.3% 45.8%
global or common good  references 42.5% 55.2% 41.7%
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Overall, Table 1 indicates that European and common good orientations with 
regard to the issue of immigration control prevail over national interests. Citizens 
demonstrate a clear tendency to look beyond the national context to validate their 
claims and to raise competing polity preferences. Citizens do in fact also engage 
with the issue of the EU polity and express strong opinions on European integration 
in relation to alternative local, national or global polity sett ings. 
Selected speech acts identifi ed through content analysis confi rm that citizens 
exhibited preferences for a more powerful EU that develops capacities of immi-
gration control. The lack of coordinated action in this area is seen as a problem 
and responsibilities should be shared instead of blaming single member states:
But what I understood today at the plenary meeting was that everybody blames 
individual member states. Italy is sending back immigrants. Spain does not want 
to do anything. Greece the same. Still, Italy, Spain and Greece are receiving these 
people, trying to select them in the best possible way. I would ask the ‘lords’ of 
the European Union what they are doing for these countries (Italian male, SG 
[small group] 12).
In addressing and recognising the EU as a polity, where borders and the insider/
outsider logic matt ers, these debates also suggest that “polity recognition” correlates 
with an evolving sense of community. As we will see from the following example, 
polity and constituency dimensions frequently overlap: 
The only thing I want to say is that we can’t really allow to sit on the fence. If we 
truly want to build a true Europe, we should talk about external borders only, 
and the EU member states should relinquish some of their sovereignty. I think 
that there’s no other way to go about it (French male, SG 11).
So, I think we should also strengthen the borders of Europe, because if we make 
all these people legal, we will have a massive arrival of migrants, and we do not 
have the capacity to welcome all these people. And it will only be to the detri-
ment of the migrants themselves (Luxembourg/Portuguese male, SG 11).
The Constituency Dimension
Any viable polity depends on a modicum of identifi cation from its citizens. As 
frequently highlighted, the EU lacks the typical identity signifi ers that are held to 
be constitutive of nation-states (Giesen 2003; Delanty 2005; Castiglione 2009). Since 
a strong political identity that would replace the existing identities of the nation 
state seems unatt ainable and for many also undesirable, the question is whether 
the European sett ing is based on a zero-sum relationship between existing national 
identities or conducive to a positive sum relationship of nested identities (Góra 
et al. 2011). From the fi rst perspective, participants in transnational mini-publics 
would be expected to defend primarily national views and interests. The group 
discussions would lead to a nationalist clash among the participants who would 
become more introverted in defending the integrity of the national community and 
mapping their att itudes onto a cultural cleavage towards their follow participants 
from other member states. From the second perspective, participation in group 
discussions would stimulate citizens to engage with others’ views and interests. 
This would lead, in turn, not only to att itude change but also trigger oﬀ  micro 
processes of identity change and socialisation of participants as citizens of Europe.
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Europolis provided an ample “laboratory” for gauging the degree to which 
group heterogeneity and language diﬀ erences aﬀ ected the deliberative mini-public 
as a democratic constituency. Did participants in the multinational and pluri-lingual 
sett ing of Europolis have equal opportunity to participate in the debate and to con-
tribute to deliberative exchange and opinion formation? In the following analysis, 
we analyse possible eﬀ ects of ethno-cultural heterogeneity and language pluralism 
with special emphasis on socialisation, group refl exivity and identity formation.
Group Solidarity. Qualitative data from transcripts give numerous examples of 
the development of what we call refl exivity of participants which turned group delib-
erations into critical voice of the citizens. Critical refl exivity was partly encouraged 
by the specifi c task the group had to perform in formulating expert questions and 
addressing policy makers. The confrontation with experts and other groups in the 
plenaries created shared expectations that were exchanged among the participants 
especially in the last round of the debate. The development of critical and refl exive 
att itudes as part of group deliberation can be considered as an important identity 
marker. We can distinguish between diﬀ erent layers of deliberations which can 
encompass a critical refl ection on the role of participants as citizens, on the purpose 
of the scientifi c experiment and their role therein, and fi nally, a meta-discourse on 
Europe and its complex identity questions. For obvious reasons, critical refl exivity as 
part of the group discussions is unequally developed; in some instances, it is given 
only sporadic expression and restricted to single statements, in other instances, it 
unfolds in longer sequences through dialogue among the participants.
First, group solidarity is enhanced by the processes of becoming refl exive as 
citizens of Europe and expressing critique towards the experts and politicians. In 
the following statement, an Italian participant confronts the unitary visions of the 
citizens (the participants of the panel) with the still divided positions of the political 
representatives (the experts of the plenary). We (the citizens) can make proposals 
and provide solutions for problems, which we feel are ours. We can, in principle, 
convert from nationals to Europeans. But they (the politicians) are not able to give 
substance to a European identity. They do not know how to use the opportunities 
(like a citizen forum) for us but only for them. They do not take up our ideas but 
only follow their opportunistic interests:
[we should] ... make a question to our political representatives of Europe: Wheth-
er (and when) Europe will give substance to a European identity. (...) We could 
give the proposals and solutions to our problems (but) we must feel them as our 
problems, we should feel as Europeans… the fact that we still (mainly) have a 
national identity is limiting strongly our ability and participation. In fact, the 
participation in European elections’ was shameful. The sense of belonging (to 
Europe) is lacking (Italian male, SG 7).
More specifi cally, the experts and politicians are criticised for their unwillingness 
to provide concrete answers or their incapacity to make themselves understand-
able to the citizens. This lack of responsiveness is then generalised as a European 
experience that marks the citizen-elite divide of the EU and justifi es the democratic 
response of indignant citizens against the elites in Brussels:
What I experienced as a person, I felt that these young women (experts and pol-
iticians who participate at the plenary sessions) ... even if they wanted to give 
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us the answers, those were not the answers in my opinion. ... And I am sorry 
for this but if I could decide who should occupy those places at the European 
Union I would suggest placing us there. Why so many people are moved from 
their homes (to work for the EU) if they can’t give us concrete answers? (Italian 
female, SG 12).
This indignation about the incomprehensible experts and elites is also shared 
by other participants. In the following statement, the upcoming elections are seen 
as an opportunity to mark a diﬀ erence. Again, a “we”-feeling is created by distin-
guishing participants of the experiment as the forerunners of a European citizenry 
who should guarantee that only the “really qualifi ed” are elected.
... now we have the European elections, and we should all do the ‘advertising’ in 
order to select the qualifi ed people. So they will not come there only to be ‘chair 
warmer’ (Italian male, SG 12).
Secondly, group solidarity is enhanced by the processes of becoming “refl ex-
ive” as being part of a European experiment. Refl ections on the purpose of the 
experiment are a recurrent topic of group discussions. Participants see themselves 
confronted with the expectation that they should develop a common understanding 
and we-feeling as Europeans. In general, this possibility is not rejected but taken 
up as an opportunity for further refl ection:
… the purpose of this research is to understand how the discussions may change 
our views ... and I think that the possibility to communicate with each other 
could help us to understand each other bett er and could lead us to feel more 
European ... because we get to know other people and we discuss with them ... 
so the time we spent here is good for us (UK female, SG 07).
Another Italian participant refl ects about the privileged experience to partici-
pate in the scientifi c experience, which for him is also a “human experience.” He 
is however fully aware of the isolated character of the experience and deplores the 
lost opportunity for the EU to not making a more systematic use of the ideas and 
proposals that are produced by the citizens:
I wonder why this opportunity is not used by the EU. It could have been an 
opportunity for the EU and for the people to bring up new ideas. In fact, it could 
have given the space for (our) new ideas that could have become active and not 
only passive proposals (like now). Instead, it’s only good for us as an experience, 
but in the end it only remains a ‘discourse’ that we carry with us, but this benefi t 
does not suﬃ  ciently justify that the EU is losing this opportunity (Italian male, 
SG 07).
Participants thus combine their critical refl ection about the experiment with the 
expression of critique of the EU and the state of European democracy. As a case of 
second-order refl exivity, this transformation of becoming a European citizen can 
again become an element of refl exive group deliberation. It is then recognised that 
the experiment was not helpful in an instrumental sense to arrive at bett er policies 
and solutions but rather in a symbolic sense to make participants aware of the 
dimensions of European citizenship:
… this meeting, at least in my opinion, did not help us to solve or to clarify the 
problems of immigration. But, it increased the awareness of European citizen-
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ship. Not because they made me feel more European, but because they made me 
be more careful towards the people we are selecting to represent us in Europe 
(Italian female, SG 12).
While acknowledging the potential for transnational identity formation, another 
participant also underlined its possible pitfalls and limits. A contrast to this is found 
in the interplay between diﬀ erent modes of identity that might change over time: 
For me, Europe and the world are a village (…) A Frenchman for example, com-
ing from the south of France to the north of France, is like in a foreign country. 
And with the years, he will become used to the people of Northern France and 
the people of Northern France will become used to him. (…). And I think that 
those who welcome the migrants should create situations where people can bet-
ter integrate themselves. I think if you do that, you’re not going to lose your iden-
tity, you’re not going to lose your origins (…) (Luxembourg/Portuguese male, 
SG 11).
These fi ndings on critical refl exivity of group discussions strongly back an 
understanding of refl exive public deliberation as an eﬀ ective means to overcome 
cultural incommensurability (Bohman 2003). Socialisation factors of taking part 
in an assembly like a deliberative poll matt er to explain the transformative force 
of deliberation in intercultural sett ings. The challenges of cultural pluralism are 
thus minimised by the eﬀ ects of group refl exivity. Participants from diverse eth-
no-political groups are committ ed to shared practices for providing evidence and 
discussing solutions to common problems. What is more, participants from diverse 
socio-cultural background are critically engaged in contesting political authority 
and defi ning their role as European citizens.
These fi ndings on group refl exivity and socialisation as a counter-eﬀ ect to 
cultural fragmentation are also strongly backed by the post-deliberation ques-
tionnaire poll.12 The views and perceptions of participants on the behaviour of 
other participants, provides answers to the degree of cohesion and “group-ness” 
in the transnational mini-public of Europolis. Overall, the participants evaluated 
their experience of participating in the deliberative event as highly positive. Only 
28 percent of participants felt that their group fellows mainly cared about their 
own country and not about European Union. 88 percent agreed that participation 
was equal in small group discussions. The experience of meeting and talking with 
other people from all across the continent and with diﬀ erent cultural background 
also had an impact: 81percent of the participants thought that they had learnt a lot 
about people diﬀ erent from themselves, “about who they are and how they live.” 
84 percent felt that their fellow participants respected what they had to say, even 
if they did not necessarily agree. On average, the participants thought the event 
extremely balanced and considered the quality of the group discussions they took 
part in to be high. Most importantly, participants from other member states were 
not seen as hostile players who defended diverging interests but as equals who 
expressed strong views and provided accessible justifi cations.
On this score, then, we can conclude that, overall, the results of analyses of 
EuroPolis groups show that contrary to the communitarian assumptions, ethno-cul-
tural plurality has no signifi cant impact on deliberative quality and the possibility 
for citizens from diﬀ erent member states to debate and fi nd agreement on issues 
of common concern.
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Impact of Language Pluralism. For the purpose of this analysis, language is used 
as the second analytically distinct though not independent variable in constituting 
a critical public. In the post-deliberation questionnaire poll language was seen by 
only 12 percent of the participants as a barrier to follow the debate and “understand” 
their fellow European citizens. When analysing language group participation and 
interactions in diﬀ erent sequences of deliberation in the four groups analysed the 
results are more mixed (Table 2).
Table 2: Equality, Language Groups and the Role of Moderators*
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Total speech acts (excluded moderator) 46 21 21
Moderator intervene to engage individual participants 15.2 % 4.5 % 5.0 %
Moderator intervene to engage linguistic group (engl) 0.0 % 0.0 % 10.0 %
Neutral or positive reference to other arguments 50.0 % 90.9 % 85.0 %
UK and IRL 56.9 % 50 % 68.1 %
Italian  n. of speech acts 43.1 % 50 % 31.9 %
Total 100% 100% 100%
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Total speech acts (excluded moderator) 64 35 20
Moderator intervene to engage individual participants 11.00% 8.6% 30.00%
Moderator intervene to engage linguistic group 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Neutral or positive reference to other arguments 39.1% 34.3% 50.0 %
UK 67.2% 44.2% 50 %
Bulgarian n. of speech acts 32.8 % 55.8% 50 %
Total 100% 100% 100%
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Total speech acts (excluded moderator) 46 9 16
Moderator intervene to engage individual participants 20.7% 22.2 9.1
Moderator intervene to engage linguistic group 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Neutral or positive reference to other arguments 50.0% 42.2% 66.7
FR  LUX %  of speech acts 30.8% 15.6% 25.8%
UK IRL %  of speech acts 69.2% 84.4% 74.2%
Total 100% 100% 100%
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Total speech acts (excluded moderator) 76 9 16
Moderator intervene to engage individual participants 2.6 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Moderator intervene to engage linguistic group (sw) 3.9 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Neutral or positive reference to other arguments 35.5 % 11.1 % 43.8 %
Swedish  n. of speech acts 23.3 % 23.5 % 37.5 %
Italian  n. of speech acts 65.1 % 70.6 % 62.5 %
Spanish  n. of speech acts 11.6 % 5.9% 0.0 %
Total 100 % 100 % 100% 
*The percentages of each linguistic group speech acts are calculated by weight of each language 
within the composition of small group.
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In our analysis of group discussions we approached the criterion of equal 
participation by weighting each linguistic group’s share in deliberation. Table 2 
indicates that all linguistic groups participated in group discussions. Furthermore, 
moderators rarely intervened to engage specifi c linguistic groups in discussion but 
barely encouraged individual participants to get on board in the debates.  There 
are, however, some patt erns of language dominance in two groups (11 and 12) 
that correlate with the language spoken by the moderator while in the other two 
groups (8 and 7) moderating eﬀ ects on language dominance did not become salient. 
Our data set is too small to further enquire this question of language dominance. 
Possible intervening variables that explain the variation on the share of group 
participation are the design of the group sett ing, delays in waiting for translations 
and individual styles of moderation.
Another possible explanation for the minimisation of language as an impact on 
deliberative quality is that pluri-lingual sett ings are in fact especially conducive 
towards certain “habits of listening” (Doerr 2008; 2009). Transnational groups might 
turn out to be more att entive listeners and overcome habits of hearing in familiar 
national sett ings. In a discussion among co-nationals we know intuitively whom 
to listen to and whom to ignore. In a transnational sett ing, this familiarity is not 
given. In EuroPolis this was amplifi ed by the technical equipment (simultaneous 
translations, headphones and microphones) which helped focus the att ention of 
the participants. Participants were routinely asked to speak slowly and keep their 
speech intelligible in order to facilitate translation and thus mutual understand-
ing. The higher listening requirements of the pluri-lingual sett ing might thus 
have worked positively for the deliberative quality. In all, then, our results with 
regard to the equality of participation and status of language groups confi rm the 
overall trend of the Europolis experiment that plurality is not a principled barrier 
to deliberation. Participants did not isolate themselves but engaged in debate with 
citizens from other language groups. 
Conclusion
In this article, we have explored whether deliberation is feasible if partici-
pants respond to a polity of dispersed authority and interact in a transnational 
and pluri-lingual sett ing. The analysis of group discussions from Europolis has 
furnished two main fi ndings. Firstly, the EU polity is recognised and taken as a 
reference point by citizens for exercising communicative power and impact on de-
cision-making. In this sense, Europolis generated a counterfactual and microcosmic 
European “public,” where citizens from highly diverse backgrounds and despite 
language pluralism have debated and contested each other on issues of principle 
and policy related to European integration. Problems of understanding related to 
the use of several languages in heterogeneous group sett ings can thus be partly 
overcome, though there remain restrictions in how the principle of political equality 
can be approached and how the overall representativity of the experiment can be 
defended (Olsen and Trenz 2013).
Secondly, the constituency created in Europolis was mainly one of critical refl exiv-
ity toward experts and political elites. As such, our qualitative data highlights delib-
eration’s community-generating and transformative role against the communitarian 
view that certain pre-political requisites must always be in place for deliberative 
democracy to function eﬀ ectively. The participants did not all become wholehearted 
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Europeans or came to share a specifi c political identity. We show, however, that 
they in certain sequences of the deliberation developed a critical and collective 
problem-solving capacity on issues of shared relevance (Dewey 1927; Dryzek 2009). 
In other words, Europolis instilled in its participants a deliberative refl exivity which 
went beyond mere preference exchange: we have provided examples of how some 
of them developed what Dryzek (2009) has highlighted as a capacity to identify 
systemic shortcomings after confrontation with experts and politicians. Our anal-
ysis shows, then, that the EU polity received “recognition through criticism.” By 
giving citizens the opportunity to discuss and voice opinion, deliberative polling 
raises awareness of the complexities of political decision-making and democratic 
legitimacy. We therefore conclude that communicative barriers as deriving from 
dispersed authority and group heterogeneity in the post-national constellation are 
for the most part practical and not substantial. They can be overcome by careful 
design of the deliberative sett ing which facilitates encounters among the participants 
and generates habits of respect, listening and learning.
Notes:
1. For an overview of how deliberative polls are organised, see Fung 2003. See also Fishkin 2009. 
2. The unit of analysis of the DQI is a speech act delivered by a participant. The entire discussion is 
broken down into smaller speech units and each speech act is coded separately. Every speech act 
is coded for all the variables included in the coding scheme. 
3. See Steiner et al. (2004) for the coding scheme.
4. New categories of interest for this study will be listed and explained later in the text.
5. The question used to measure those attitudes read: And on a scale from 0 to 10, where “0” 
means “entirely at the EU level,” “10” means “entirely by the individual Member States,” and “5” 
is “exactly in the middle,” at what level do you think decisions should be made in each of the 
following areas? Immigration; Climate Change; Fighting unemployment; Fighting crime.
6.  “Control” issues are those that were not discussed during Europolis, namely: unemployment 
and crime.
7. The questions that allowed the measurement of identity change read as follows: On a scale from 
0 to 10, where “0” is “not at all,” “10” is “completely,” and “5” is “exactly in the middle,” how much 
would you say you think of yourself as being European?; And on the same 0 to 10 scale, how much 
would you say you think of yourself as just being from your [country]? Only country=10; And if 
you had to choose just one of the following alternatives, what would you say you see yourself 
as…? 1-nationality only/ 4-European.
8. The DQI category “content of justifi cation” allows to assess whether justifi cation of the 
statements or speech acts have been backed referring to benefi ts and costs of all. The DQI 
distinguishes three types of justifi cation: Explicit statement concerning constituency or group 
interests (own country); Explicit statement in terms of a conception of Europe in utilitarian 
or collective terms; Explicit statement in terms of the common good or diff erence principle 
(solidarity, quality of life, justice, etc.).
9.  We counted the number of speech acts delivered by participant/linguistic group.
10. The DQI category that captures the nature of moderator intervention is also a new category 
for the purposes of Europolis. In our study we specifi cally probe whether moderators of selected 
groups intervene to engage specifi c language groups in the debate.
11. The DQI categories that allows the measurement of degrees of interactivity is coded “Respect 
toward other arguments” and distinguishes between:  No reference to other participants’ 
arguments; Negative reference to other participants’ arguments; Neutral reference to other 
participants’ arguments: and Positive reference to other participants’ arguments.
12. The questionnaire data are available on http://cdd.stanford.edu/polls/eu/ under the heading “Results.”
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